ABSTRACT In a modern hospital information system, an online appointment registration system has become a mainstream trend. It brings convenience and reduces waiting time for patients in the hospital. However, it also causes patients' personal privacy disclosure and security vulnerability problems. In order to address these issues, we propose a novel secure-aware online appointment registration system, which can achieve department matching and doctor searching with privacy preservation. First, a patient can describe his/her symptoms with searchable encryption and sends the ciphertext to the cloud server. Then, the electronic health record (EHR) cloud server matches information of the department associated with similar symptoms and sends the department in the ciphertext to the patient. Furthermore, the patient sends his/her requirements with attribute-based keyword search encryption to doctors' profile system (DPS) server, which can search for the appropriate doctors corresponding to the encrypted requirement without decrypting it. The doctors' profiles are sent to the searcher in the ciphertext. At last, the patient can make an online appointment with the expected doctor. The security analysis demonstrates that the system can achieve data confidentiality and integrity, mutual authentication, secure search, anonymity, and trapdoor unlinkability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Along with high-speed development of communication technology, a growing number of people would like to make an appointment with doctor through an online outpatient booking system rather than spending much time registering at hospital. As a consequence, an increasing number of researchers begin to pay serious attention to the medical registration system. In [1] - [3] , many researchers proposed various medial online appointment frameworks. Cao et al. in [1] tried to investigate the efficacy of the web-based appointment system in the registration service for outpatients. Zhang et al. in [2] The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Sabah Mohammed.
surveyed online appointment systems for outpatient appointments and service in China. Peng et al. in [3] discussed web-based medical appointment systems under the current health care environment for identifying most effective services or components of them. They also explore the benefits and barriers of implementation.
Furthermore, in order to improve the performance of medical registration system, more works focus on quality of user experience in [4] - [8] . Specifically, Samadbeik et al. in [4] evaluated all outpatient appointment booking websites in Iranian hospitals for generating an efficient and proper online appointment booking procedure and improving the level of patient satisfaction. Eze and UnekeChen in [5] assessed treated patients' perception on scheduling hospital appointment and used a convenience sampling method that was conducted in a primary health center in Abakaliki. Due to the fact that hospital doesn't quite understand patients' ideas regarding diversified appointment registration systems, Yu et al. in [6] investigated the use of diversified appointment registration systems and explored the factors influencing patients' registration system choices. For reducing the long waiting time of registration to see a doctor and improving the quality of medical service, Bo in [7] designed a web based long-distance appointment registration system which patients can choose the correct guidance of the experts, specialist or targeted medical services and hospital out-patient services. Additionally, Mu et al. in [8] built a disease selfinspection and hospital registration recommendation system to help people do the disease self-inspection. It made an online registration fast. For the sake of avoiding wasting medical resources and assisting patients to match the appropriate departments and desired doctors, quite a few researchers studied the medical data sharing and matching in appointment registration [9] - [11] . All of these works made lots of contributions in improving the efficiency of online registration and the performance of outpatient services.
Despite the efforts, few works considered personal information security and privacy when a patient makes an appointment with doctor in online-registration system. Unfortunately, there are many potential security threats and privacy leakage when a patient makes an appointment online in the current appointment registration system. Therefore, it is critical to focus on privacy preservation and medical data security in registration system.
In the traditional online registration system, patients need to know exact which department to visit so that they can make an appointment with the doctor of that department. However, in actual life patients don't know which department to register. Fortunately, they can describe their symptoms in details. On the other side, even though they know which department to register, they don't know how to choose an appropriate doctor. This brings great inconvenience to the patients and also limits their choices. Aiming to solve those problems, we propose a security-aware department matching and doctor searching protocol for online appointment registration system. In our system, when a patient visits a doctor, the corresponding health records are encrypted under patient's public key and stored in the electronic health record (EHR) cloud. Another patient, who has no idea which department to register, can describe his/her symptoms in details and search in the cloud server that stored many medical health records. The cloud server matches the symptoms and sends the information of department in ciphertext to patient. The patient can determine appropriate department after accessing the plaintext. 1 Then, the patient sends requests to the cloud server that stored the corresponding department doctors' profiles in ciphertext. Afterwards, the doctors who meet with patient's requirements are feedback to the patient. Therefore, the patient can make an appointment registration online.
In summary, our contributions are threefold as follows.
• We design a new framework for security-aware online appointment registration system. During the process of making an online appointment, users' privacy and security of health record can be preserved by using cryptography primitives.
• We propose a novel department matching scheme based on conjunctive keyword search. Users can search for relevant data in ciphertext of health record by describing their symptoms. But users cannot access original health records so that the confidentiality of health records can be guaranteed.
• We propose a doctor searching mechanism for users. A user is able to appoint with appropriate doctor who satisfies his/her requirements through attribute-based keyword search. The user describes his/her requirements as an attribute set and encrypts the set to protect his/her privacy. Then, the ciphertext is sent to the cloud server for searching expected doctor. Afterwards, an appointment can be directly made between the user and the intended doctor.
We organize the rest of our paper as follows. An overview of the related work is conducted in Section II. The preliminary is presented in Section III. We formalize the system architecture, threat model and security requirements in Section IV, followed by the proposed protocol in Section V.
In Section VI, we analyze the security of our scheme in details. Then, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme and compare with other schemes in terms of communication overhead and computational overhead in Section VII. In the last section, we draw our conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
In order to improve user experience in online appointment registration system without violating user's privacy and protecting security of EHR, public key encryption with conjunctive keyword search (PECK) and attribute-based keyword search (ABKS) are explored to achieve these goals. In this section, we survey the two techniques.
Song et al. in [12] firstly proposed searchable encryption for searching on encrypted data. As it has inefficiency that user only searches his/her personal encrypted data, Boneh et al. in [13] proposed public key encryption with keyword search scheme, which is able to search in ciphertext without decrypting it. Furthermore, Baek et al. in [14] and Fang et al. in [15] improved the public key encryption with keyword search scheme to enhance its security. Due to the fact that these schemes only search one keyword each time while users usually need more keywords for search, Dong et al. in [16] proposed the two earliest schemes for public key encryption with conjunctive field keyword search which allowed user to search for multiple-keyword simultaneously. Followed by, more and more researchers in [17] - [23] have focused on conjunctive keyword search scheme and made various constructions. Specifically, Zhang et al. [17] proposed an efficient public key encryption with conjunctive-subset keywords search that made search more properly and powerfully. Additionally, Yang et al. [19] proposed a conjunctive keyword search with proxy reencryption for e-health clouds to achieve time enabled privacy-preserving keyword search. However, these schemes have high computational cost. In our work, we propose a symptom matching scheme based on the work of [17] and [19] for reducing the computational overhead.
Attribute-based encryption allows users with proper attributes to decrypt ciphertext that is encrypted through an access control policy [24] , [25] . Combined attribute-based encryption with searchable encryption, Kaushik et al. in [27] proposed an attribute-based searchable encryption, which can require less storage space on the cloud but providing fine grained access control to authorized users. In order to address issue of attribute revocation, Zu et al. in [28] proposed a new ciphertext-policy attribute-based scheme with efficient revocation. Based on above, Zheng et al. in [29] firstly proposed attribute-based keyword search scheme, keywords of which are encrypted through an access control policy. Users with appropriate attributes can generate search token to search over encrypted data. Moreover, Sun et al. in [30] proposed an attribute-based keyword search to realize fine-grained ownerenforced keyword search authorization by multiple data owners and data users. In our work, we propose a doctor searching scheme based on the work of [29] and [30] .
III. PRELIMINARY A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of same large prime order q. A mapping e : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 is called an admissible bilinear pairing, if it satisfies the following properties: 
In cryptosystems, the private key d is usually an integer and the public key T is a point on the curve the coordinates of which are T = (x T , y T ).
ECDLP Assumption. Assume that it is hard to solve the ECDLP in polynomial time. Public key encryption with keyword search allows user to query multiple encrypted keywords at the same time to match desired document. In general, PECK scheme consists of the following algorithms [19] .
• SystemSetup 1 λ : Take a security parameter λ as input, and output the system parameter params.
• KeyGen i (params): Take the system parameter params as input, and output a private and public key pair (x i , X i ) for the entities.
• PECK (X A , X C , W ): Take the entity A's public key X A , the entity C' public key X C and a keyword set W = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w l ) as input, and output the ciphertext C W for W .
• Trapdoor (X C , x A , Q): Take A's private key x A , the C's public key X C and a keyword query Q = (w 1 , . . . , w m ), m ≤ l as input, and output a trapdoor T Q .
• Test C W , T Q , x C : Take ciphertext C W , a trapdoor T Q and C's private key x C as input, it returns '1' if W contains Q and '⊥' otherwise.
D. ATTRIBUTE-BASED KEYWORD SEARCH
Attribute-based keyword search is a primitive which can enable data owner to assign a policy for controlling the keyword search operations over its encrypted data. That is, a user who wants to search expected document in ciphertext must satisfy those attributes. In a general way, it is composed by the following algorithms [29] .
• Setup 1 λ : Take a security parameter λ as input, and output the system parameter params. • KeyGen (params, M): Take the system parameter params and an access tree M as input, compute the secret key S a .
• Enc (T, w): Take an attribute set T and keyword w as input, and output the ciphertext C T .
• TokenGen (S a , w): Take the secret key S a and keyword w as input, and output the search token ε.
• Search (ε, w): Take the search token ε and keyword w as input, return '1' if 'w = w ' and '⊥' otherwise.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The system model consists of four entities: Trusted authority (TA), cloud server, user and medical service providers (MSP) as shown in Fig. 1 .
1) TA
TA is an entity that can be trusted by user, MSP and cloud server. TA generates the public and private key pairs for the registers. At the same time, TA generates the trapdoor and sends it to the cloud server. Additionally, TA generates the attribute keys for user.
2) CLOUD SERVER
Cloud is a semi-trusted authority who is responsible for storing data. It consists of two data servers: EHR server and DPS server. The EHR server stores patients' health record in ciphertext. The DPS server keeps records of doctors' profiles including their name, department, affiliation, and so on. Meanwhile, it searched for health records and doctor's information which satisfies user's symptoms and requirements.
3) USER
User refers to patients who can describe their symptoms in detail to search for information of department in EHR cloud. The users can also put forward corresponding requirements as an attribute set to search for desired doctor in DPS cloud.
4) MEDICAL SERVICE PROVIDER
Medical service providers, including the physician, clinic, family doctors and so on, encrypt a patient's EHR under his/her authorization and EHR generators' profiles (usually doctors). Then the ciphertext is sent to cloud servers.
B. THREAT MODEL
In our scheme, we assume that TA is global trusted. The cloud servers are semi-trusted, i.e., it is honest but curious. It obeys the protocols but it may access EHR or DPS. In addition, some malicious adversaries could modify the data. Furthermore, it is faced with the threat of divulging the data owners' privacy and personal information during data transmission.
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Considering the threat model above, the security requirements of our scheme are as follows:
1) DATA CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY
Data confidentiality can protect EHR and DPS from leaking the patients' privacy and data providers' information. Data integrity can ensure the message not be altered or modified while it is transmitted. VOLUME 7, 2019
2) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
The user, the MSP and the cloud server can authenticate each other to ensure that the ciphertext comes from reliable resources and gets to expected destination.
3) SECURE SEARCH
The user can obtain the information of department by searching in the cloud. However, he/she cannot access original EHR and DPS. The attacker could guess the search token or the trapdoor of any keywords to obtain the related ciphertext. Therefore, it's necessary to protect the search tokens against the keyword guessing attacks (KG Attacks). Additionally, it is essential to be indistinguishable against chosen keyword and ciphertext attack (IND-CKCA). It means that the cloud server couldn't distinguish the encrypted ciphertext from keyword set from the trapdoor for given keywords. Meanwhile, it cannot know the ciphertext of the specific keywords even if all trapdoors for the other keywords are available.
4) ANONYMITY
Any entities in the system cannot identify the real identity of the user during the processes of online registration except the TA. The identity should be confidential.
5) COLLUSION RESISTANCE
The user cannot obtain the other information of MSP except the search results even if he/she colludes with the cloud server. Additionally, any two users cannot access data although they combine their search tokens.
6) TRAPDOOR UNLINKABILITY
The trapdoor unlinkability should be achieved for preserving the privacy of search. The EHR and DPS stored in the cloud server can be searched many times. The cloud servers cannot learn or deduce any keyword information from the trapdoors. The same keyword in different searchings should generate different trapdoors. Therefore the trapdoor function should be randomized rather than determined.
V. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
In this section, we firstly present an overview of our proposed protocol and then describe the protocol in details.
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The proposed protocol consists of four phases: System initialization, data generation and storage, department searching, and doctor searching. First of all, a user and an MSP register to TA to get their public keys and private keys. Meanwhile, the doctors' profiles and attributes are encrypted and stored in DPS server as C D , C T . When a user visits an MSP, the MSP encrypts user's EHR, keyword set, and the information of department as C M , C W , and C P respectively. The ciphertext is sent to the EHR server.
A user, who doesn't know which department to register, describes his/her symptoms as a keyword set. He/She encrypts the keywords under TA's public key and sends the ciphertext to TA. TA decrypts the ciphertext and generates a trapdoor according to the keyword set. Then the trapdoor is sent to the EHR cloud server for searching for an appropriate department. If there is a matching result, TA sends a reencryption key to the cloud. Then the cloud server re-encrypts the ciphertext with re-encryption key and sends it to the user. Lastly, the user decrypts re-encrypted ciphertext with his/her private key to get the information of department.
After obtaining the information of the department, the user defines an attributes set that contains department and other requirements. 2 Firstly, the user sends search token to the cloud server. Secondly, the cloud server searches in the DPS. If there is a subset of the user's attributes satisfying C T , the cloud server sends ciphertext which contains the encrypted doctor's profile to user. Finally, the user can obtain doctor's profile by using content key. Consequently, user can have an appointment with a doctor that he/she is interested in online.
B. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 1) PHASE 1 SYSTEM INITIALIZATION a: STEP 1 (SYSTEM PARAMETER GENERATION)
Given a security parameter λ, TA selects a bilinear map e : 
The item σ (·) is a general signature algorithm and Enc (·) is one symmetric encryption algorithm. TA randomly chooses a, b, c, α, β ∈ Z * q as the secret key of the system. Meanwhile, TA randomly chooses x A ∈ Z * q as the master private key and computes the public key X A = x A P. Finally, TA generates system parameter params = (q,
b: STEP 2 (REGISTRATION)
A user or an MSP chooses a random value x i ∈ Z * q as his/her private key and TA computes X i = x i P as his/her public key. He/She registers to the system with real identity RI D i . TA computes a pseudo identity PID u i for the user by encrypting user's real identity RID u i with searchable encryption [33] . 3 The cloud server randomly selects x C ∈ Z * q , as the private key and computes X C = x C P as the public key. It sends the public key to TA. TA stores the public key in the public key tree.
2) PHASE 2 DATA STORAGE
When a user visits an MSP, the MSP encrypts the user's health record with the use's public key. Additionally, the information of department and keywords of health record are encrypted with the public key of TA as follows 4 : MSP chooses a random µ ∈ Z * q , and computes C 1 = µX A , C 2 = e (µP, P) · H 1 (X A )·M . The information of department M is encrypted as C P = (C 1 , C 2 ) . At the same time, the patient's health record is encrypted under patient's public key as C M .
MSP selects a keyword set W = (w 1 , . . . , w l ) for health record. Then it randomly chooses r, s ∈ Z * q and computes C 4 , B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B l ) .
MSP computes the signature σ 1 =σ (C M C P C W ). Then, it sends θ 1 = (C M C P C W σ 1 ) to the cloud server. When the data packet θ 1 arrives, the cloud server extracts it and stores the medical information in the cloud.
MSP encrypts the doctor's profile, such as department, name, sex, post, and so on. Firstly, MSP chooses a content key
MSP defines the access policy of doctor's profile as an access tree. The access tree contains a set of attributes T s and each leaf of access tree is associated with one of these attributes. Let a j represent the associated attribute of the leaf node j. It computes the secret shares of r 2 for each leave of access tree T. Each leaf j is associated with a secret share value q j (0). q n (0) is the share r 2 of the secret tree for node n according to access tree T. Then it computes K j = q j (0) P and D j = q j (0) H 0 a j . The doctor's attributes are encrypted as C T = T, K , K 0 , K , K j , D j a j ∈ T s , and the doctor's profile is encrypted as C D = (C 5 , C 6 ). At last, MSP computes σ 2 = σ (C T C D ) and sends θ 2 = (C T C D σ 2 ) to the cloud server. After receiving the packet, the cloud server stores it in DPS cloud.
3) PHASE 3 DEPARTMENT MATCHING
In this section we concentrate on how to match symptom with department by conjunctive keyword search, as shown in Fig. 2 . The process of symptom keyword search is presented as following steps.
a: STEP 1 (CONJUNCTIVE KEYWORD SEARCH)
A user sends a keyword set encrypted under TA's public key and k i to TA, where k i is a tempt secret key between TA and the user. Upon receiving the keyword ciphertext from user, TA firstly decrypts the ciphertext by using its private key and 4 In our scheme, user only searches for the keywords and the corresponding department. selects a random
After receiving the request θ 3 , the cloud server computes t = e(x C X A , C 4 ) and checks whether the following equation holds
If the equation doesn't hold, it outputs a symbol '⊥'. Otherwise, the match result '1' is sent to TA. TA extracts C 1 and C 2 from the corresponding C P . Then TA computes z i = H 3 (k i ) and computes the re-encryption key rk = (rk 1 , rk 2 ) = X i x A , z i P . Furthermore it sends rk to the cloud server.
Correctness: When the ciphertext of conjunctive keyword associated with health records and the trapdoor generated by the user match each other, W ⊆ Q, then the test algorithm holds.
After receiving re-encryption key, the cloud server randomly chooses ω ∈ Z * q and re-encrypts C P as C P = C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , VOLUME 7, 2019
where
Then the cloud server sends the result θ 4 = (PI D u i C P σ 4 ) to user.
Once the packet arrived, the user decrypts the ciphertext C P by using its private key as follows:
After getting the information of department M , user can determine which department to choose for an appointment. It can execute the following doctor searching phase to find out appropriate doctors.
4) PHASE 4 DOCTOR SEARCHING
Based on the above searching results, the user can determine which department to register. Furthermore, he/she can set more requirements as an attribute set A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a v }, v n. For example, A ={department, sex, name, affiliations. . . } Then, he/she can make an appointment with a doctor who satisfies the attributes based on the attribute-based keyword search protocol, as shown in Fig. 2 .
a: STEP 1 (KEY GENERATION)
This step is performed by TA and user. Firstly, the user assigns a set of attributes A associated with the requirements of doctor and generates the associated attribute keys for user. TA randomly selects r ∈ Z * q and computes C 7 = (ac − r) P/b, C 8 = (α + r) P/β. For each a j ∈ A, TA randomly chooses r j ∈ Z * q , and computes A j = rP + r j H 0 at j , B j = r j P. The secret key is output as S a = A, C 7 , C 8 , A j , B j a j ∈ A . TA computes the signature σ 5 = σ (S a ) and sends θ 5 = (S a σ 5 ) to the user as θ 5 = (S a σ 5 ).
b: STEP 2 (TOKEN GENERATION)
After receiving θ 5 , the user generates search token as follows:
• Chooses s ∈ Z * q , and computes ε 1 = (a + b) sP, ε 2 = csP, ε 3 = sC 7 , and
• Computes A j = sA j and B j = sB j for each a j ∈ A. Thus, the search token ε can be set as ε = (A, ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 3 , A j , B j a j ∈ A ). The user computes σ 6 = σ PI D u i ε and sends θ 6 = PI D u i ε σ 6 to the cloud server.
c: STEP 3 (Search)
Upon receiving search token from the user, the cloud server checks if there is a subset of the user's attributes that satisfies the access tree T specified in C T . If there is a subset S, for each a j ∈ S, the cloud server computes E j = e A j , K j e B j , D j = e rsP, q j (0) P and combines these values to recover
The cloud server checks if e (K , ε 1 ) E n e ε 3 , K = e (K 0 , ε 2 ). If the equation doesn't hold, it outputs symbol '⊥'. Otherwise, it sends the associated doctor's information C D and E n to the user. The cloud server computes σ 7 = σ PI D u i C D E n and sends the search results θ 7 = PI D u i C D E n σ 7 to the user.
Correctness: When a j ∈ S and the user's search token is accordant to ciphertext of doctor's profile, then the test algorithm holds.
e (K , ε 1 ) E n e ε 3 , K = e (cr 1 P, (a + b) sP) e (rr 2 P, sP) e ((ac − r) sP/b, br 2 P) = e(P, P)
After receiving the packet θ 7 , the user computes
Finally, the user can obtain doctor's information which satisfies requirements using the content key k to decrypt the ciphertext C D . Then, the user can have an appointment with the expected doctor.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze how the proposed protocol effectively prevents the potential threats and achieves the security objectives presented in section .
1) The proposed protocol achieves data confidentiality and integrity. The health record and information of department in the cloud servers are in ciphertext under TA's public key and secure symmetric key. The eavesdroppers cannot obtain the plaintext without retrieving the private key and symmetric key. Under ECDLP assumption, the private key is secure. The doctors' profiles and attributes are encrypted as C T and C D , which can only be decrypted by satisfying the access policy. In this way, data confidentiality can be achieved. Moreover, the data integrity is guaranteed by the signature of the ciphertext during the transmission. 2) The proposed protocol achieves mutual authentication. The MSP can authenticate the user, because only the intended user is able to obtain the department by using private key x i . Also, only the intended user can retrieve symmetric key k to get the information of appropriate doctor. Additionally, the cloud can authenticate MSP by verifying the signature σ 1 and σ 2 . Furthermore, the signature σ 3 and σ 4 can help TA to authenticate the cloud.
3) The proposed protocol achieves secure search. Proof: Our proposed scheme is based on ABKS algorithm in [29] . We improve it according to specific application without changing the security model. Due to space limitation, more details of proof of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 can be referred to [29] . 4) The proposed protocol achieves anonymity. During the whole data transmission processes, the user sends and receives the ciphertext with his/her pseudo identity. The cloud server cannot deduce the real identity of the user from the encrypted keywords and re-encryption key. 5) The proposed protocol achieves collusion resistance.
In the department searching phase, the user receives the re-encrypted ciphertext that is generated by the user's public key and TA's private key. TA is trustable. Therefore, the user cannot collude with the cloud server to get any information of the data provider and health records. In the doctor searching phase, TA randomly selects a number r, which is only known to TA, to compute the attribute keys for user. Even if some users have same attribute set, their attribute keys are different. Different users aren't able to collude to access the data. In this way, collusion resistance can be achieved in our scheme. 6) The proposed protocol achieves trapdoor unlinkability. The search information may be deduced if trapdoors are same with the same keyword set when the trapdoor generation function is determined. In our scheme, TA selects two random T Q,−1 , ξ to generate a trapdoor T Q during the process of the department searching. Meanwhile, user chooses a random number to compute the search token ε during the process of doctor searching. By this method, there are different trapdoors or tokens in different search turns even though it contains same keyword. Accordingly, the cloud cannot link the relationship of the trapdoors.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we mainly analyze communication overhead and computational overhead of the proposed protocol. Additionally, we compare with several relevant schemes.
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
We donate |G 1 |, |G 2 |, |E|, |σ | as the size of the elements in G 1 , G 2 , the identity of user and the signature. During process of the data storage, the communication overhead between MSP and the cloud server is generated by packets θ 1 and θ 2 .
The packet of θ 1 is composed by C M , C P , C W , σ 1 , the total length is (3 + l) |G 1 | + |G 2 | + |σ |. It's worthy to note that the length of C M is not considered here because it is determined by the encryption method and it is not included in the later steps. Additionally, θ 2 consists of C D , C T and σ 2 , causing
For the user, the communication overhead is caused by the search token ε between DPS server and user. Its length is
At the cloud servers, the communication overhead between EHR server and user is 2 |G 1 | + |G 2 | + |E| + |σ |. The communication overhead between DPS server and user is |G 1 | + 2 |G 2 | + |E| + |σ |. Therefore, the total communication overhead of cloud servers are 3 |G 1 | + 3 |G 2 | + 2 |E| + 2 |σ |.
As for TA, the communication overhead is caused by trapdoor and secret key, respectively. The communication overhead between TA and EHR server is (l + 1) |G 1 | + |E| + |σ | during the process of sending the trapdoor. The communication overhead between TA and user for sending secret key is (2v + 1) |G 1 | + |G 2 | + |E| + |σ |. Hence, the communication overhead of TA is (2v + l + 2) |G 1 | + |G 2 | + 2 |E| + 2 |σ |, as shown in TABLE 1. 
B. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD
We compare our proposed scheme with two PECK schemes in Yang and Ma [19] , Zhang and Zhang [17] and two ABKS encryption schemes in Zheng et al. [29] , Sun et al. [30] in term of computational overhead.
We donate t p , t m , t e the execution time for bilinear pairing, scalar multiplication, and exponentiation. In the phase of department searching, the computational cost is mainly generated by key generation, encryption, trapdoor and test. The time consumption of key generation is t m . The bilinear pairing map e (P, P) can be pre-computed so that no additional time will be consumed. Thus, it takes (l + 5) t m to encrypt the keyword set associated with the information of the department and costs (l + 1) t m to generate a trapdoor. The execution time of the test is (l + 2) t m . The comparison of computational overhead for searchable encryption with Yang and Ma [19] , and Zhang and Zhang [17] is shown in TABLE 2.
In the phase of doctor searching, the main computational overhead of the ABKS schemes comes from four parts: Key generation, encryption, token generation, and search. It costs (2v + 2) t m to generate key and (2v + 2) t m to encrypt the attributes. It takes (2s + 3) t m to generate a search token. The searching process consumes (2s + 3) t m . The computational overhead comparison of the searchable encryption with Zheng et al. [29] and Sun et al. [30] is shown in TABLE 3 .
Additionally, we analyze the computational overhead of four entities: The user, the MSP, the TA, the cloud server. In our protocol, the computational overhead of MSP is caused by generating ciphertext of the department C P and doctor's profile C D besides C W and C T . It takes t m + t e to generate C P and t m + t p to encrypt C D , respectively. Consequently, computational overhead of MSP is (2n + l + 10)t m + t e + t p in all. It takes user (2v + 3) t m to generate search token, (2v + 3) t m to decrypt the ciphertext C P and t e + 2t p to retrieve the content key k. Hence, the total computational overhead of user is (2v + 4) t m + 2t e + 3t p . TA carries out (l + 1) t m to output trapdoor and (2v + 2) t m to generate secret key (2v + 2) t m . What's more, it takes TA 2t m to compute re-encryption key. Thus, TA consumes (l + 2v + 5) t m overhead totally. As for the cloud server, the major computation is testing and searching. Besides, it consumes 3t m overhead for re-encryption. Therefore, the computational overhead of cloud server is 3t m + (l + 2n + 5) t p + nt e . The computational overhead of each entity is shown in TABLE 1.
In [32] , Xiong and Qin implemented the algorithms on an Intel PXA270 processor at 624 MHz installed on Linux personal digital assistants, the running time are t e = 53.85ms, t m = 30.67ms and t p = 96.20ms, respectively. We also have similar settings to evaluate the performance.
The comparisons of computational time with different schemes are demonstrated in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 . Fig. 3 portrays computational time of each stage of our scheme with the variations of keyword amount l. We have also tested the schemes in Yang and Ma [19] and Zhang and Zhang [17] in the same experiment. Fig. 4 portrays the computational time of each stage of our scheme to compare with the schemes in Zheng et al. [29] and Sun et al. [30] along with attribute size n, where v = n.
The comparison results indicate that our proposed scheme has a slightly lower computational cost and achieves a higher efficiency than the schemes of Yang and Ma [19] and Zhang and Zhang [17] in all stages of the PECK. This is because we use the multiplication operation instead of exponentiation operation. Similarly, the computational time of our ABKS scheme is a little less than the schemes of Zheng et al. [29] and Sun et al. [30] due to the fact that there is no exponentiation operation in our scheme. Notably, from Fig. 4(b,d) , we can know that the computational time of our scheme is slight higher than the scheme in Sun et al. [30] . VOLUME 7, 2019 
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel secure-aware online appointment registration system, which can achieve department matching and doctor searching. On one hand, it can match appropriate department by describing the symptoms for user. On the other hand, it can also search desired doctor meeting with user's requirements. All searches of the above are secure so that patients' privacy and security of health records are ensured. Furthermore, security analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme can achieve security objectives, including data confidentiality, integrity, mutual authentication, secure search, anonymity, and trapdoor unlinkability. Additionally, we find that our scheme has slightly lower computational cost compared with other schemes through performance evaluation. In future work, we will focus on improving and increasing the feasibility and practicality of the proposed protocol.
APPENDIX

A. SECURITY MODEL OF PECK
The security model of IND-CKCA and IND-KGA is the same as [15] .
B. SECURITY PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Given a security parameter λ, the two games between adversary A and challenger C are as follows.
Game 1: A is assumed to be a server. A challenger C is given with an instance of the truncated l-ABDH problem, denoted by a tuple (P , P l+1 , P, P 1 , . . . , P l , Z ), where Z is either e P l+1 , P or a random element in G, P i = α i P, P i = α i P .
• Setup: Challenger C randomly selects β ∈ Z q * as the cloud server's private key x C and computes X C = βP. The receiver randomly chooses α ∈ Z q * as private key and computes X A = αP. It sends (X C , x c , X A ) to A while x A is unknown for A.
• Phase 1: A makes the queries.
Trapdoor queries: A adaptively queries a keyword set Q i = w i,1 , . . . , w i,m , m ≤ l, then gets a trapdoor for the user A i . C randomly chooses T Q i ,−1 , ξ ∈ Z * q and computes
Then C can successfully simulate the trapdoor and send it to A. Test query: A adaptively performs test queries for a keyword set and ciphertext. C checks it and sends the test results to A.
• Challenge: A outputs a challenge of keyword set (W 0 * , W 1 * ) and C performs as follows:
, where F i is the coefficient of χ i in F (χ). r * is random while P P is coincidentally random. 7) Suppose that Z = e(P , P l+1 ), then
which is a valid encryption for W ν * and sends it to A.
• Phase 2: A can perform a number of queries as in Phase 1, except the following queries. It is not allowed to be queries while the generated trapdoor is distinguishable for W 0 * and W 1 * .
• Guess: A outputs the guess ν ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary will win if ν = ν , which means Z = e P , P l+1 . Otherwise, it will lose which means Z = e P , P l+1 but a random element in G.
In the guess phase, if adversary can break the scheme with advantage ε, e P , P l+1 will appear in the tuple list with probability 1 2 + ε at least. Thus, C's advantage to solve the truncated decisional l-ABDH problem is ε 1 ≥ ε.
Game 2: A is assumed to be an outside attacker including the receiver.
A challenger C is given with an instance of DBDH problem, denoted by a tuple (P, αP, βP), where Z is either e(P, P) abc or a random element in G, P i = α i P, P i = α i P .
• Setup: C randomly picks a ∈ Z q * as the receiver's private key x A and computes X A = aP as the receiver's public key. Let X C = cP, x C = c be the cloud server's public and private key pair. Then it sends (X A , X C , x A ) to A while x C is unknown for A.
• Phase 1: A makes the queries as follows.
Test query: A adaptively performs test queries for a keyword set and ciphertext. C checks it and sends the test results to A.
• Challenge: A outputs a challenge of keyword set (W 0 * , W 1 * ). Then C performs as follows:
C creates a challenge ciphertext C * w which is a valid encryption for W ν * and sends it to A.
• Guess: A outputs the guess ν ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary will win if ν = ν , which means Z = e(P, P) abc . Otherwise, it will lose which means Z = e(P, P) abc but a random element in G. In the guess phase, if adversary can break the scheme with advantage ε, e(P, P) abc will appear in the tuple list with probability 1 2 + ε at least. Thus, C's advantage to solve the DBDH problem is ε 2 ≥ ε.
C. SECURITY PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let A be an outsider adversary, which neither the server nor receiver. It makes the KG attack. Given a security parameter λ. A is given with an instance for DDH problem, denoted by (P, αP, βP), where Z is either αβP or a random element in G 1 . A challenger C can compute the solution of the DDH instance by playing game with A as follows.
• Setup: C randomly picks β ∈ Z * q as the cloud server's private key and computes X C = βP as the cloud server's public key. C randomly selects x A ∈ Z * q and computes X A = x A P. Thus, the receiver's public and private key pair is (X A , x A ). Then it sends (X A , X C ) to A.
• Phase 1: A makes the following queries. ). Thus, the valid encryption of trapdoor T * Q for W * ν is sent to A as challenge trapdoor.
• Phase 2: A can perform the same queries as in Phase 1 only when the trapdoor is not distinguish for W * 0 and W * 1 .
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